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INTRODUCTION
The election of Donald Trump has brought many surprising and farreaching policy changes. Particularly dismaying has been his attitude towards
environmental protection and climate change. He has systematically begun
to dismantle environmental protections in favor of business efforts, and this
is nowhere so obvious as in his promotion and protection of the coal industry.
Indeed, it appears some of his policy initiatives come straight from the hands
of coal companies.1
Trump campaigned on promotion of coal and extractive industries, and
one of the clearest ways he is trying to help those industries is by increasing
the amount of land available for resource extraction. To that end, the
Administration (largely through the Department of Interior) is working to
*
Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School and Profesora Visitante, Universidad Pontificia ± Comillas
(ICADE). Many thanks to Kalyani Robbins, symposium participants, FIU, and members of the Royalty
Committee that shared their experiences with me. My Buffalo colleagues were insightful when I presented
part of this research at a faculty workshop. Erin Ryan and Matt Steilen were particularly helpful with the
sections on federalism, but should not be blamed for the crudeness of my analysis. Early conversations
with Michael Blumm helped shape the essay and inform my larger research agenda, and he deserves my
thanks.
1 See Lisa Friedman, Donald Trump Accused of Treating Coal Baron Robert Murray’s Wishes for
(Jan.
10,
2018),
Mining
Sector
Like
a
‘To
Do
List’,
INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-coal-mining-environmentalregulations-rollback-robert-murray-wish-list-fossil-fuels-a8151556.html (detailing Murray¶s impressive
level of presidential access and influence).
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remove environmental protection for lands, shortcut environmental review
processes, and facilitate the issuance of mining permits and energy leases.
When adopting these policies, the Trump Administration sometimes
acknowledges that it is working to promote energy extraction businesses, but
also often suggests that changing policy efforts are based on a desire to give
states more power in controlling natural resources within their borders. In
this way, President Trump can argue that he is working to promote his
federalist ideals as a mask for his cronyism.2
This essay examines changes in policies regarding coal extraction from
the Obama Administration to the Trump Administration. Section I discusses
patterns and debates regarding control of natural resource federalism,
examining the Trump Administration¶s platform of shifting more resources
to local control. Section II describes federal coal-leasing policy, tracing the
efforts begun by the Obama Administration followed by the policy changes
being implemented by the Trump Administration. Section III illustrates that
the Trump Administration is making resource management decisions from a
different perspective compared to earlier presidential administrations, with
more benefit focused on business and industry groups than on individuals.
As with previous republican administrations, the Trump Whitehouse has
announced a policy strongly favoring states¶ rights and suggests its
management decisions are stemming from that principled stance. Spoiler
alert: they aren¶t. The piece concludes by revisiting some of the statutes and
principles that underlie the rules for natural resource management to assess
whether the Trump Administration is complying with the sentiments that
form the basis for the rules. Spoiler alert: it isn¶t.
I.

NATURAL RESOURCES FEDERALISM

Federalism is generally the term we use when discussing the delicate (or
sometimes not so delicate) balance between federal and state action. A
continuous debate in our country surrounds which rights should belong to the
states and which to the federal government. The logical starting point for this
discussion is the Tenth Amendment,3 which tells us that all things not
2 See Heather Long, Trump is a ‘Crony Capitalist,’ Says GOP Senator Flake, WASH. POST (Aug.
2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/02/trump-is-a-crony-capitalist-saysgop-senator-flake/?utm_term=.3ebedbc7d358; Nomi Prins, The Magnitude of Trump’s Cronyism is Off
the Charts—Even for Washington, NATION (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/themagnitude-of-trumps-cronyism-is-off-the-charts-even-for-washington/; Noah Smith, Trump Wants
(Oct.
11,
2017),
Consumers
to
Pay
for
Keeping
Coal
Alive,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-11/trump-wants-consumers-to-pay-for-keeping-coalalive.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. X (³The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.´).
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specifically enumerated by the Constitution as belonging in federal hands
should be in the realm of state law. Much debate has centered on which
branch of government gets the honor of interpreting the Constitution to assess
which things belong in the federal realm.4
The statement that everything not designated as federal should be left to
the states is not as helpful as it may first appear. The truth is that the U.S.
Constitution is not as clear of a document as we suggest it to be. Lack of
clarity from the Constitution is likely because the problems of today were not
contemplated, and the need for precise language was unrealized.5
The lack of constitutional clarity is easy to see in the realm of
environmental law. Many environmental laws find their constitutional
footing in the Commerce Clause (although the Treaty Power and Property
Clause have significant roles to play as well).6 Yet, the Commerce Clause is
confusing, and courts have struggled for years to determine its boundaries. 7
This leaves a muddy debate over the division between state and federal
powers in environmental law.
The patterns of environmental pollution and land degradation in our
nation demonstrate why federal policies governing natural resources are
often necessary.8 For natural resources and land conservation, the concept of
environmental federalism is less clear. It is not the environmental federalism
that we think about, with the federal government setting the standards and
then the states running the program. The relationship is different for a few
reasons.
First, while the federal government is the owner of many of the nation¶s
natural resources, resource extraction can feel like a particularly local event.
While climate change has global implications, there is no debate that an

4

See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011).
Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s Power to
Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL¶Y 849, 851±56 (2002) (discussing early understandings
of commerce).
6 Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003).
7 See Bork & Troy, supra note 5, at 850±51. Some of the trickiest Commerce Clause cases have
involved the Clean Water Act. Robert W. Adler, US Environmental Protection Agency’s New Waters of
the United States Rule: Connecting Law and Science, 34 FRESHWATER SCI. 1595, 1595±97 (2015)
(describing Commerce Clause debates in the context of jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act); Mark
Squillace, The Judicial Assault on the Clean Water Act, 59 FED. L. 33, 35±39 (2012) (describing the
Supreme Court¶s Clean Water Act jurisdictional jurisprudence). While the Supreme Court readily
acknowledges a federal interest in keeping navigable waters and channels of commerce free from
pollution, the Court struggles over how far its interests in waters can stretch. This is a conversation
complicated by changing understandings of hydrology and chemistry.
8 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 590 (1996)
(explaining why federal environmental laws are needed); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 118 (2005) (explaining how the overlapping federal and state
jurisdiction can improve environmental protection).
5
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action like forest-clearing still has local benefits and drawbacks. The jobs are
local. The soil erosion is likely local. The water quality aspects are local or
regional. Yet, the biodiversity implications could be global. The climate
change impacts are clearly global. Thus, one natural resource extraction
decision could affect people and governments at all different levels.
With widespread federal landownership, the issues about responsibility
and decision-making power is not hung up on constitutional debates. The
Property Clause of the Constitution solidifies the federal government¶s
ability to make all needful rules covering its lands,9 and federal courts have
consistently interpreted this rule expansively, acknowledging widespread
federal powers that can at times extend beyond the boundaries of the public
lands.10 The status of the federal government as a landowner makes the idea
that the federal government has the power to make the rules governing natural
resources and environmental conditions on its land logical. I do not suggest
the question whether the land should be in federal hands lacks controversy,
but once we accept the federal government as landowner, the idea that this
landowner gets not only the right to manage its own lands but a superior right
to set rules that conflict with state law does not seem like that much of a
stretch.
Second, we have a unique legal history with natural resources. Under
Roman law, many natural resources were said to be owned by the people.11
This included water,12 air,13 wildlife,14 and coastal lands.15 While title to the
resources resided in the people, the government acted as a trustee, protecting
and managing these resources on behalf of the citizens.16 This concept was
translated to British law, with the ownership largely going to the crown but
imposing on the king an obligation to safeguard the resources on behalf of
present and future generations.17 The English kings differed in their
interpretation of this duty. As the land and resources of the King of England
9

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518
(1897); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
11 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 475±78 (1970) (discussing the historical foundations of the Public
Trust Doctrine).
12 Id. at 475.
13 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 at p. 55 (translated Peter Birks and Grant McLeod 1987)
(³The things which are naturally everybody¶s are: air, flowing water, the sea, and sea-shore.´).
14 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 640 (1985).
15 Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in
Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 524 (1992).
16 See Sax, supra note 11.
17 Charles F Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429±31 (1989).
10
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in the New World passed to people of the United States after the American
Revolution, it was not clear whether the federal government or the state
government would serve the role of trustee.18 Worry about an overly
consolidated federal power, alongside a feeling that the states were closer to
the people, meant that the law was generally interpreted as making the state
the controller of natural resources.
This leaves us with a muddle. We say it makes the most sense for the
states to manage natural resources, but then the federal government is
actually the owner of a lot of them, and then we have the pesky problem of
natural resources that cross or span state borders making the impacts of
natural resource extraction felt at different levels. What is a good federalist
to do?
The justifications for federal ownership are many, but here we focus on
the idea that the federal government must manage and care for these public
trust resources on behalf of all Americans. That is, with public lands and
resources, the federal government takes an expansive view of who the public
is²going beyond the citizens that directly come in contact with the
resources. This broader or longer view combined with a progressive era idea
of government officials with expertise in resource management would bring
about the greatest good, for the greatest number, for the longest time.19
Where the federal government is the landowner, it makes sense that the
federal government is the decision maker, as with private landowners.20 But
such a pattern has not always sat well in regions where the federal
government is a large or majority landowner.21 In such areas, the states and
the citizens of those states may feel that the deck is skewed too heavily in
favor of the federal government. This complaint has been particularly

18

Id. at 453±60.
U.S.
FOREST
SERV.,
PINCHOT
AND
UTILITARIANISM,
https://www.fs.fed.us/greatestgood/press/mediakit/facts/pinchot.shtml (last visited Dec. 23, 2017)
(discussing the letter outlining Gifford Pinchot¶s theory of management of federal forests as seeking to
serve the greatest good for the longest time and the movie that the U.S. Forest Service made to honor the
agency¶s centennial).
20 Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (explaining that the United States has the
same power over its land as an ordinary proprietor).
21 See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective
of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847 (1982) (describing the sagebrush rebellion, a movement
against federal landownership and decision-making); Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh & Nancy K. Stoner, The
County Supremacy Movement, 28 URB. LAW. 497 (1996) (describing the County Supremacy Movement
and state opposition to federal land ownership); Kirk Siegler, High Stakes As Rancher Cliven Bundy’s
Trial
Over
Armed
Standoff
Begins,
NPR
(Oct.
30,
2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/30/560849871/high-stakes-as-rancher-cliven-bundys-trial-over-armedstandoff-begins (describing the colorful story of the Bundy family that has led armed protests against
federal control and regulation of land in the Western United States).
19
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emotional when it comes to access to natural resources, including oil and gas,
minerals, grazing lands, recreation, and hunting.22
With clear legal justification for federal regulation of most natural
resources, the conversation changes to focus on some combination of
efficiency and ethics. Which level of government should be responsible for
resource management decisions?23 For many states, the issue is neither
constitutional language nor economic efficiency, but a more essential debate
over the nature of sovereignty and the power of the state to make decisions
about the natural resources within its boundaries. The conversation, couched
in terms of sovereignty, is undoubtedly economic. For some, the question
may be more properly phrased as which entity has the best claim on economic
returns from natural resource development?
Patterns of resistance to federal power can come from individuals who
want control over resources, like the Cliven Bundys of the world who assert
a right to use land owned by the federal government without needing to obtain
permission, follow grazing rules, or pay rent.24 We also see more coordinated
resistance from state and local governments.25 While the federal courts have
never decided in their favor,26 states routinely pass laws asserting their
ownership rights over natural resources and their right to control federal
lands.27 Although the federal government has made minimal moves to convey
lands to states or put them in full control of the resources within their
boundaries, the federal agencies sometimes seek state buy-in by including
state representatives in management decisions and, importantly, by
conveying significant funds to states via PILTs (payments in lieu of taxes)
and royalty payments.28 And sometimes, the federal government goes the
exact opposite direction and ignores state desires. We saw this with President
22 With some people willing to die for their beliefs or willing to kill for them. See, e.g., Robert
Anglen, Mohave County Renames Road After LaVoy Finicum, Militia Member Killed by Officers,
AZCENTRAL (Nov. 10, 2017, 9:44 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizonainvestigations/2017/11/10/mohave-county-renames-road-after-lavoy-finicum-militia-member-killedofficers/853161001/. We can even date this back to early forest grazing cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (challenging the Forest Service¶s ability to regulate grazing on federal
lands); see also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 F. 675 (D.
Idaho 1910) (upholding the Forest Service¶s ability to regulate activity on its land where private
individuals had mining permits).
23 See David A. Dana, One Green America: Continuities and Discontinuities in Environmental
Federalism in the United States, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 103, 107 (2017) (asking those
questions generally about environmental law).
24 Siegler, supra note 21.
25 See id.
26 United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997).
27 Ryan McMaken, Can the States Seize Control of Federal Lands?, MISES INSTITUTE (Aug. 21,
2015), https://mises.org/library/can-states-seize-control-federal-lands.
28 Don Seastone, Revenue Sharing or Payments in Lieu of Taxes on Federal Lands?, 47 LAND
ECON. 373 (1971).
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Clinton¶s designation of Grand Staircase Escalante as a National Monument,
where not only was there minimal consultation with officials in Utah but the
announcement was made in Arizona.29
Is local better? Economists Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey think so.
That was the heart of their idea of the Matching Principle, which suggests
that decision-making (including resource management decisions) should
happen at the level of government where the costs and benefits are most
directly felt.30 Embodied in their writings is an idea that local is best. Yet, it
is hard to determine the costs and benefits (both the amount and who is
actually experiencing them) in the context of natural resource management.
Often there is a disconnect between costs and benefits. For example, tax
dollars from many people support land conservation that most directly
benefits those that can see the land or that actually reside on it. The cost is
distributed and the benefits concentrated. Alternatively, prohibiting a
landowner from converting a wetland to arable farmland, imposes direct pain
on her with a benefit felt by large swaths of society who gain water filtration,
endangered species protection, and other benefits. These complicated
environmental scenarios mean that a simple cost-benefit analysis rarely
provides a satisfying outcome.
Determining which level of government is the correct manager of
natural resources does not resolve the issue of what the obligations and
responsibilities of such management should be. Depending on the level of
government, we shift who we regard as the beneficiaries. When the federal
government is the trustee, it should be thinking about land management
decisions in terms that will yield the greatest benefit for all Americans
(hopefully considering both present and future generations). As the level of
land management becomes more local, the definition of the beneficiaries
narrows to just state residents or, possibly even more devolved, to people in
a county or municipality.
The Trump Administration appears to be taking a narrower view of its
trustee responsibility than previous administrations. While theoretically the
Administration should be acting on behalf of all the current and present
generations of Americans, the Department of Interior¶s actions on natural
resource management seem to benefit a smaller subset of the public. Indeed,

29 Paul Larmer, 1996: Clinton Takes a 1.7 Million-Acre Stand in Utah, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Sept. 30, 1996), https://www.hcn.org/issues/90/2795 (describing the anger of Utah officials at the naming
of the National Monument). President Trump sharply reduced the size of the monument, a move that does
not move the land into private hands but does increase the ability to engage in extractive uses on the land.
Julie Turkewitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/trump-bears-ears.html.
30 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL¶Y REV. 23 (1996).
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as the following section will detail, policy changes seem to be targeted at
benefitting specific industries or presidential allies.
The following section focuses on one category of natural resource policy
in the Trump Administration as a glimpse into the President¶s view of natural
resources federalism. While Trump echoes the federal trust ideas and
trumpets states¶ rights, his decisions appear to be mostly maneuvers to bolster
his supporters and donors without regard to general public benefit. I examine
changes in policy regarding coal extraction on public lands. To tell this story
fully, I explain the coal-leasing program in detail, the Obama
Administration¶s restraints on the program, and the changes coming from the
Trump Administration. Along the way, I offer a few other examples that
relate to the coal industry and federal environmental and natural resource
policy. If the connection between federalism and the current coal policies
seems hazy, you are on the right track. The rhetoric of the Administration has
been one of supporting state decision-making over the interference of
government bureaucrats, but his federalism banner appears to be little more
than a smoke screen to justify cronyism. This essay thus offers a brief glimpse
into the workings of the Administration and helps us try to align justifications
and motivations.31
II. NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION:
THE CASE OF COAL
A. Coal-Leasing on Federal Lands
There are, of course, many different natural resources, and while their
management differs, their protection involves similar sentiments because of
the scarce nature of the resources and their high societal values. Management
can be particularly tricky for resources that are easily depletable or, as with
fossil fuels, essentially nonrenewable. In the context of this essay, I examine
coal extracted from public land with brief references to other fossil fuels.
Through examination of the policy changes, decision-making approaches,
and outcomes for coal, we can trace a pattern of approach from the current

31 This coal-leasing example is a small part of a larger research project into the changes in natural
resources law occurring under the Trump Administration. Two interesting patterns are emerging. One has
to do with how the Administration views natural resources statutes (primarily the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act or FLPMA) and who it views as the public beneficiaries of government policy. The
second pattern is the federalism story. The Trump Administration and its supporters seem to be mirroring
policies of the 1950s and 60s when states¶ rights and federalism served as the justification for racist
policies. Once again, states¶ rights are the rallying cry but does not really seem to be the heart of what
people making that cry care about. This essay introduces these patterns, but focuses on the second in
keeping with the theme of the symposium.
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Administration and perhaps begin to understand the direction of management
of all public natural resources in the Trump Administration.
Promotion of the coal industry was an important part of Donald Trump¶s
campaign and has been a cornerstone of his energy policy.32 Coal has long
been a central component of the U.S. energy supply and has composed
significant portions of the nation¶s electricity grid.33 Around 90% of U.S. coal
goes to the electricity market.34 Yet, coal¶s role in U.S. electricity
composition is falling. In 1990, coal made up 60% of the electricity
generation in the United States.35 By 2016, that percentage had fallen to 32%,
taking an 18% hit from 2015 to 2016.36 The reasons for its decline are
manifold: (1) a decrease in the overall demand for electricity in the early
2000s due to the recession coupled with improved energy efficiency;37 (2) a
decrease in the cost of natural gas based on the rise of hydraulic fracturing
technology;38 (3) increasing competitiveness of renewable energy sources;39
and (4) environmental policies and permitting processes.40 Thus, Trump faces
the conundrum of trying to uphold a campaign promise to reinvigorate the
coal industry that is facing challenges largely beyond his control. It is
unsurprising, therefore, that Trump has chosen to focus on reducing costs
from environmental policies and looking for other ways to streamline

32 Darryl Fears, Trump Promised to Bring Back Coal Jobs. That Promise ‘Will Not Be Kept,’
Experts Say, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2017/03/29/trump-promised-to-bring-back-coal-jobs-that-promise-will-not-be-keptexperts-say/?utm_term=.5d0c9e913f58.
33 U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
ELECTRICITY
IN
THE
U.S.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states (last visited Dec.
23, 2017).
34 U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
ANNUAL
COAL
REPORT
2016
(2017),
https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/ [hereinafter 2016 ANNUAL COAL REPORT] (³The electric power sector
accounted for about 92.8% of the total U.S. coal consumption in 2016.´).
35 Christine Klein et al., Wildlife and the Endangered Species Act, in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW,
507 (2018).
36 2016 ANNUAL COAL REPORT, supra note 34.
37 U.S. Electricity Sales Have Decreased in Four of the Past Five Years, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=14291 (explaining that
increased energy efficiency is one of the reasons for a decrease in electricity usage and that during the
2009 recession, electricity usage was lower).
38 Charles D. Kolstad, What Is Killing the US Coal Industry?, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POL¶Y
RES. (Mar. 2017), https://siepr.stanford.edu/research/publications/what-killing-us-coal-industry.
39 See Diane Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, Coal Country’s Power Plants Are Turning Away from
Coal, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/business/energyenvironment/coal-power-renewable-energy.html (discussing industry shifts towards renewable energy
technologies).
40 Klein et al., supra note 35, at 508; see also, Jeff Keffer, Excessive EPA Regulations Harming
NEWS
&
SENTINEL
(Jan.
18,
2017),
Coal
Industry,
PARKERSBURG
http://www.newsandsentinel.com/opinion/local-columns/2017/01/excessive-epa-regulations-harmingcoal-industry/ (a coal industry executive expressing his frustration with environmental regulation).
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extraction processes, areas within his control. The Executive Branch can play
a significant role in the vibrancy of the coal industry²not only because it
enforces many of the environmental regulations at play, but also because it
manages significant amounts of the country¶s coal reserves on behalf of the
American people.
When contemplating coal-leasing, two significant bodies of law come
into play. First, the coal-leasing laws themselves determine who gets to
extract coal from federal lands and the financial arrangements associated with
the transactions. These laws operate in conjunction with the general
governing rules for the Department of the Interior. Second, federal
environmental laws set rules for reducing environmental impacts and
conducting environmental review. This section briefly outlines the main
federal laws governing the extraction of coal on federal lands. It then explains
the Obama-era policies and contrasts them with those of the Trump
Administration.
The federal government owns 640 million acres of land, mostly in the
West.41 In the United States, about half of the coal produced (overall, not just
federal lands) is from underground mining that occurs in the eastern half of
the country (Appalachia).42 This bituminous coal has a high sulfur content.43
The other half of the produced coal comes from surface mines in the West on
largely federal lands.44 This sub-bituminous coal has a lower sulfur content.45
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act meant that many companies
switched to the sub-bituminous coal,46 putting higher emphasis on the
western lands, which were also more likely to be owned by the federal
government.47 The federal coal-leasing program currently supplies about
41 See CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf (explaining that the
federal government owns ³roughly 640 million acres´); Quoctrung Bui & Margot Sanger-Katz, Why the
TIMES
(Jan.
5,
2016),
Government
Owns
So
Much
Land,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/upshot/why-the-government-owns-so-much-land-in-the-west.html
(describing concentrations of public lands in the West and why that occurred).
42 LINCOLN DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 107±115 (2015).
43 James C. Hower et al., Changes in the Quality of Coal Combustion By-Products Produced by
Kentucky Power Plants, 1978 to 1997: Consequences of Clean Air Act Directives, 78 FUEL 701, 711
(1999).
44 See Nathan Joo et al., Fact Sheet: 5 Things You Should Know About Powder River Basin Coal
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Aug.
19,
2014,
9:06
AM),
Exports,
CENTER
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2014/08/19/95820/fact-sheet-5-things-youshould-know-about-powder-river-basin-coal-exports/.
45 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 42.
46 Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to
Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 324
(2001).
47 VINCENT ET AL., supra note 41 (showing concentration of federal land in the western half of the
country).
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40% of the nation¶s coal.48 Over 570 million acres of federal land is
potentially available for coal leasing with the federal government holding
either full fee simple title or only the mineral rights.49 Most (85%) federal
coal is from the Powder River Basin in Montana and Wyoming. 50 In 2014,
there were 310 federal coal leases.51 In 2015, 383 million tons of coal were
produced with federal leases.52
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), within the Department of the
Interior, manages the coal-leasing program regardless of which entity
manages the surface estate although the most likely federal surface manager
is in fact the BLM.53 Land under the federal coal-leasing program may also
be managed by other federal agencies or owned by other entities (state and
local governments as well as private parties).54
The first law governing coal extraction on federal lands was the 1872
General Mining Act.55 Congress wrote this law in the context of California
gold mining, and by the early 1900s, the federal government realized that it

48 RYAN ZINKE, U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3348, CONCERNING THE
FEDERAL COAL MORATORIUM 1 (2017) [hereinafter ZINKE ORDER]. Acting Secretary Bail¶s memo of
February 9, 2017, put that number at 42%. KRISTEN BAIL, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT, U.S. DEP¶T OF THE
INTERIOR, INFORMATION/BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ± LAND AND
MINERALS MANAGEMENT: INPUT TO LEADERSHIP ON FIVE PROMISING AREAS FOR COAL LEASING AND
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION TRENDS, LEASING INFORMATION AND REGULATION/ADMINISTRATIVE
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2017) [hereinafter BAIL MEMO].
49 See SALLY JEWELL, U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3338,
DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TO MODERNIZE THE FEDERAL
COAL PROGRAM 1 (2016) [hereinafter JEWELL ORDER].
50 New Powder River Basin-Wide Coal Assessment of Recoverable Resources and Reserves,
USGS
(Feb.
26,
2013),
https://energy.usgs.gov/GeneralInfo/EnergyNewsroomAll/TabId/770/ArtMID/3941/ArticleID/961/NewPowder-River-Basin-Wide-Coal-Assessment-of-Recoverable-Resources-and-Reserves.aspx.
51 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at 2.
52 BAIL MEMO, supra note 48, at 2.
53 The BLM oversees the leasing process while other entities govern other parts of the process.
OF
LAND
MGMT.,
U.S.
DEP¶T
OF
THE
INTERIOR,
See
Coal,
BUREAU
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). States and the
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) have regulatory responsibilities over
the operations while the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) collects, disburses and verifies
revenues from leases and keeps. See Who We Are, OFF. OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP¶T OF INTERIOR, https://www.osmre.gov/about.shtm (last updated Aug. 10,
2017); Payments, OFF. OF NAT. RESOURCES REVENUE, U.S. DEP¶T OF INTERIOR,
https://www.onrr.gov/reportpay/payments.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
54 Coal
Data, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal/coal-data (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). For the
purposes of this essay, we set aside discussion of Indian lands as they are governed by other laws and are
associated with a federal trust obligation that does not arise in the context of other lands.
55 See General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C.).
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was not a good fit for all mineral extraction.56 Legislators agreed that they
should regulate fossil fuels and other substances (like fertilizers)
differently.57 This led to the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act.58 The 1920 Act
instituted a competitive leasing process and, unlike the 1872 Act, contained
no provision for transferring lands out of federal ownership.59 There were
two parts to the program. Alongside the competitive leasing process for
known areas of coal resources was a ³preference right leasing process´ that
encouraged private parties to explore and develop coal reserves not yet
known.60
The coal-leasing program proceeded under this approach until the 1960s
when there were concerns about speculation in the coal-leasing market.61 By
the 1970s, however, government officials became wary of the development
of the program.62 They worried that prospectors were obtaining permits
without diligently pursuing exploration.63 Thus, the essential concern was
underexploitation (with associated lower revenue generation). This led to the
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976.64 With this statute, the
federal government abandoned the preference rights for not-yet-known
sources and created an exclusive competitive leasing process.65 Alongside the
statute, the Department of the Interior promulgated regulations.66 The
regulations set minimum royalty rates of 12.5% for surface mines and 8% for
underground mines.67 The regulations also indicated that where mining was
to occur on lands managed by the U.S. Forest Service or another land

56 David Gerard, The Development of First-Possession Rules in US Mining, 1872–1920: Theory,
Evidence, and Policy Implications, 24 RESOURCES POL¶Y 251, 255 (1998).
57 See Robert C. Anderson, Federal Mineral Policy: The General Mining Law of 1872, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 601, 613 (1976).
58 See 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2018).
59 As with other natural resources laws of the time, the General Mining Act was a land dispersion
act, which sought to facilitate exploitation of federal natural resources and also conveyance of federal
lands into private hands. Because miners could work the land without the burden of landownership, many
chose not to exercise the ability to patent the land and gain full fee simple title. KLEIN ET AL., supra note
35.
60 Id. at 509.
61 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at 5.
62 KLEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 509.
63 See Mark Squillace, The Tragic Story of the Federal Coal Leasing Program, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV¶T 29, 30 (2013).
64 Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act, H.R. 6721, 94th Cong. (1976); see Sam Kalen, Where
Do We Go From Here?: The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act—Past, Present, and Future, 98 W.
VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024±25 (1995).
65 See Cedric Hustace, The New Federal Coal Leasing System, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 323,
359 (1977).
66 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3420±3470 (2018).
67 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3±2 (2018).
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management entity, that agency¶s consultation and approval is required.68
Consultation with states and Indian tribes is also required before land can be
opened to leasing.69
Also, in 1976, Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA).70 This statute serves as the organic act for the
BLM, outlining its duties and giving details about its methods of operation.71
BLM studies in the 1970s showed that the number of acres under production
increased while the levels of coal production actually fell.72 The BLM
responded by placing a moratorium on coal-leasing while engaging in an
environmental review under the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).73 The process resulted in a programmatic environmental impact
statement, a comprehensive environmental review for the program as a
whole, followed by NEPA litigation, and eventually new leasing regulations
(that were again subject to litigation).74 These leasing regulations²the 1979
coal-leasing regulations with amendments in 1982²are the ones that still
govern operations today. The moratorium implemented during the
environmental review process was gradually scaled back and fully lifted in
1981.75
In 1981, concerns regarding the calculation of fair market value in the
Powder River Basin reared their ugly heads.76 This led to the establishment
of the Linowes Commission in 1983 to investigate pricing.77 The
Commission imposed another moratorium on leasing while conducting an
environmental study.78 That moratorium was lifted in 1987.79 Unfortunately,
these reviews did not seem to alleviate the underlying pricing and
competition concerns.

68

43 C.F.R. §§ 3420.1±6, 3420.4±2 (2018).
See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3420.1±7, 3420.4-3, 3420.4-4 (2018).
70 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94±579, 90 Stat. 2743.
71 Frank Gregg, Symposium on the Federal Land Policy and Management Act: Introduction, 21
ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 271 (1979).
72 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at 5; see ROBERT H. NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL
POLICY 25 (1983); Squillace, supra note 63, at 30.
73 See John Latz, The Federal Coal Leasing Program, PUB. LANDS MIN. LEASING: ISSUES AND
DIRECTIONS 1 (1985).
74 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT SUPPLEMENT FOR THE FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 4 (1985) (explaining that
NEPA process from 1979-1985).
75 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49 at 5, 6.
76 Id. at 6; Squillace, supra note 63, at 30.
77 Sandra L. Blackstone, Getting the Coal Leasing Program Back on Track: The Linowes
Commission and Beyond, in PUB. LANDS MIN. LEASING: ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 1, 5 (1985).
78 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(c).
79 Id.
69
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The 1979 regulations establish two avenues for leasing. One is where
the BLM reviews an area of land and designates zones as open for bidding
(regional leasing).80 The other is where the members of the public (i.e.
energy/extraction companies) file applications to open an area to extraction
(leasing by application).81 The regional system was only briefly used in the
1980s, and since then, all coal-leasing has occurred by application.82 This is
true despite the fact that regional leasing is supposed to be the default process
and leasing by application only to occur in unusual circumstances.83
If you seek to mine coal on federal land today, you must proceed through
a somewhat lengthy but relatively straightforward process. The first step is
to identify an area you want to mine and ask the BLM to open it up for
competitive bidding.84 The BLM assesses the land and determines whether it
should be opened for coal-leasing. The BLM reviews the application to make
sure it is complete, conforms to existing land-use plans, and contains enough
information to determine the fair market value of the coal.85 It then begins
the environmental review process86 and consults with landowners, states,
tribes, and other stakeholders.87 It also checks to see whether the surface
owner will consent.88 Note, because the mineral estate is considered the
dominant estate, holders of the mineral estate have a right to extract the
subsurface minerals even where such extraction may impact the owners of
the surface estate.89
After or in conjunction with public commenting, the BLM estimates the
fair market value of the coal.90 It keeps that information confidential while
opening the area for bidding (thus, the initial application is just to allow
bidding on a certain parcel, but the entity filing the application will not
necessarily end up with the lease). Bids are accepted, and the winning bid is
80

43 C.F.R. § 3420 (2014).
Id. at § 3425.
82 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a).
83 Squillace, supra note 63, at 3.
84 There is also a process for opening up new areas under non-competitive bidding, through a lease
by modification process. Under the lease by modification process, an existing leaseholder can request to
have a tract added but must demonstrate that it would not be of competitive interest. That is, but for the
applicant, the mineral resources would not be exploited. BAIL MEMO, supra note 48, at 2.
85 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a).
86 The question of when to conduct NEPA review in the context of coal mining has been a fraught
topic since the 1970s. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 120±132.
87 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a). This stage could also involve actions under Section 7
of the Endangered Species Act or review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. See
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West 2004); 54 U.S.C.A. § 306108 (West 2014).
88 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a).
89 Kendor P. Jones et al., Split Estates and Surface Access Issues, in LANDMAN¶S LEGAL
HANDBOOK 193±95 (5th ed. 2013).
90 43 C.F.R. § 3422.1(b) (2014).
81
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the highest one received but cannot be lower than the fair market value.91
This means that there could be a failed bidding process if none of the bids
received matches the fair market value estimated by the BLM. Bidders must
meet eligibility requirements and pay certain fees.92 Bids contain a proposal
for royalty payments, rental payments, and an initial payment.93 By
regulation, the royalty payments cannot be under 12.5% for surface mines or
under 8% for underground mines.94 In theory, bidders could offer more in an
attempt to be the winning bid, but this rarely happens. This is likely because
in over 90% of the leases, there is only one bidder²the person who initiated
the process to begin with.95
Once a company has won the bid, it has to get a permit under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), and it has to obtain
approval of a federal mine plan from the Assistant Secretary for Land and
Minerals.96 The BLM receives money in three ways: (1) bonus paid at the
time of lease issuance, (2) rental fees, and (3) production royalties.97 All three
sources of money are split evenly with the state.98 This gives states a financial
incentive to not only increase mining overall but also to increase royalty and
rent levels. This may be particularly so where the subsurface and surface are
both held by the federal government because there is no competing interest
coming from the surface owner. This reveals the state motivation for
encouraging coal-leasing.99 The activity occurs on federal land, but the state
gets half the money.100

91

Id. at § 3422.1(c)(1); JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a).
43 C.F.R. § 3472.1±1 (2014).
93 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a).
94 43 C.F.R. §§ 3473.3±2(a)(1)±(2) (2014).
95 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b)(i).
96 The major environmental laws at play are the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321±4375 (2016); 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201±1328 (2016). NEPA requires environmental review for federal actions that may
significantly affect the environment. SMCRA requires a permit for any coal-mining operations regardless
of whether on public or private land. The issuance of a SMCRA permit triggers NEPA so a NEPA process
is required for all coal operations in the United States.
97 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a).
98 Squillace, supra note 63, at 3.
99 However, even under this scenario, a state should be motivated to improve the competitive
nature of the bids or set minimum bidding levels as current bids appear to be well below market. Id. at 4±
5.
100 See, e.g., Bill Chappell, U.S. Announces Moratorium on New Coal Leases on Federal Lands,
NPR (Jan. 15, 2016, 9:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/15/463164790/u-smoratorium-on-new-coal-leases-to-be-announced-friday (stating that in 2014, Wyoming received over
$555 million from federal coal leases).
92
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B. Coal-Leasing Policy Under the Obama Administration
After years of concerns with the federal coal-leasing program from
multiple fronts, the Secretary of the Interior in the Obama Administration,
Sally Jewell, called for an ³open conversation about modernizing the [ ] coal
program.´101 Also inspiring action were reports completed by the Office of
the Investigator General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office
(GAO).102 These reports (the ³OIG/GAO Reports´) expressed concern with
whether taxpayers were actually receiving fair market value from the sale of
coal.103 The reports noted problems with a lack of transparency,104 and their
findings on absence of competition suggested an oversupply of coal.105
The Department of the Interior began a series of listening sessions in
2015.106 The five listening sessions involved hundreds of attendees and 289
speakers.107 Over 92,000 comments were submitted.108 The comments
identified six themes of concern: (1) global climate change,109 (2) loss of jobs
and revenue, (3) need for increased transparency and public participation plus
concerns over inadequate compensation, (4) the royalty rate (both the idea
that it needs to account for environmental costs and that it should match
offshore extraction), (5) need to keep rates low (and even make them lower),
and (6) streamlining of the leasing process.110

101 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR, 1 FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT²SCOPING REPORT ES-3 (Jan. 2017)
[hereinafter PEIS SCOPING REPORT].
102 U.S. GOV¶T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD ENHANCE
APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE MORE PUBLIC
INFORMATION (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP¶T OF
INTERIOR: REPORT NO. CR-EV-BLM-0001-2012, FINAL EVALUATION REPORT ± COAL MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM (2013) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
103 GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 15±17; OIG REPORT, supra note 102, at 1.
104 GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 47.
105 Benjamin Storrow, Moratorium Announced on New Coal Leases, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Jan.
15, 2016), http://trib.com/business/energy/moratorium-announced-on-new-coal-leases/article_5342a826cacd-5120-9e6a-23cfee3c865f.html.
106 PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101, at 2-2.
107 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b).
108 PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101, at 2-2.
109 Under the Paris Agreement, the Obama Administration pledged to reduce emissions to 26±
28% below 2005 levels by 2025. There is no current mechanism in the coal-leasing process that considers
climate change impacts or seeks to reduce them. A potential exception comes from the recent Tenth Circuit
decision in WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., where the court held that the BLM must
consider greenhouse gas emissions in its NEPA review. 870 F.3d 1222, 1228±1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2017);
Court Defends Climate Overturns Massive Coal Mining in Wyoming, WILDEARTH GUARDIANS (Sept. 15,
2017), http://www.wildearthguardians.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=13190#.Wz7bLthKjfY
(on file with author).
110 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b).
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The problems related to fair return present a complicated economics
puzzle. A 2014 BLM manual and guidebook provided policy guidance (note
this is agency guidance and not binding law) regarding calculation methods
for the fair market value of coal leases.111 Unfortunately, there are very few
bids in the process, making it hard to estimate the fair market values.112 The
process also fails to account for externalities in setting the fair market
value.113 Additionally, although regulations set minimum royalty rates,
royalty rates may go below the mandated minimum where an applicant seeks
a lease modification or applies for a royalty-rate reduction.114 Studies showed
that these practices were prevalent.115 There is a minimum bonus rate, of $100
per acre, which some have labeled ridiculous.116
In January 2016, Secretary Jewell issued Secretarial Order 3338.117 The
order announced a programmatic environmental review of the coal-leasing
program alongside what it labeled a ³pause´ in issuing new coal leases during
the pendency of the review process.118 The ten-page order begins by
explaining the purpose of the Secretary¶s actions, stating that the Department
of the Interior is entrusted with overseeing federal resources for the ³benefit
of current and future generations.´119 The Secretary asserted that doing so
involved advancing a ³safe and responsible development of energy´ while
also considering conservation, scientific, historical, and environmental
values ³for generations to come.´120 Secretary Jewell pointed out that the
governing regulations for coal leasing dated back to 1979, when our
understanding of environmental impacts and the contours of the coal industry

111

BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR, H-3070-2, ECONOMIC EVALUATION

OF OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES HANDBOOK.
112

JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b)(i).
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 43 C.F.R. § 3473 (2014); Stephen Lacey, Noncompetitive Coal Leasing Policies Cost U.S.
Taxpayers $29 Billion Since 1982, THINK PROGRESS (June 25, 2012, 8:18 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/noncompetitive-coal-leasing-policies-cost-u-s-taxpayers-29-billion-since-19822ebc6ae6a957/; see also Ben Jervis, Subsidized to the End: Not Even Corporate Welfare Can Save Big
Coal, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:35 PM) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/benjervey/subsidized-to-the-end-not_b_9554742.html; JAYNI FOLEY HEIN & PETER HOWARD,
RECONSIDERING COAL¶S FAIR MARKET VALUE: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF COAL PRODUCTION AND THE
NEED
FOR
FISCAL
REFORM
8
(2015),
http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Coal_fair_market_value.pdf.
117 The review was about the leasing of the federal mineral estate and contained exceptions for
Indian lands and actions by OSMRE and ONRR. See generally JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49.
118 See id. at § 5.
119 Id. at § 1.
120 Id.
113
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were far different from what we encounter today.121 Based on these factors,
she directed the BLM to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS),122 something that had last been done in the 1970s.123
In explaining her authority for choosing to do a ³discretionary PEIS,´
Secretary Jewell noted that the Department of Interior is authorized to
undertake the effort based on:
[I]ts stewardship role as a proprietor and sovereign regulator
which is charged by Congress with managing and overseeing
mineral development on public lands not only for the
purpose of ensuring safe and responsible development of
mineral resources, but also to ensure conservation of the
public lands, the protection of their scientific, historic, and
environmental values and compliance with applicable
environmental laws.124
These sentiments and those mentioned above mirror the purposes of the
public lands as articulated by Congress in the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA).125 Secretary Jewell further explained the
decision to conduct a PEIS as a statutory duty to ensure a fair return to the
taxpayer.126 She invoked 1920 Mineral Leasing Act, SMCRA, and
FLPMA.127
Instead of calling it a moratorium, she labeled her action a ³pause´ on
the issuance of new federal leases.128 As coal leases last over twenty years,
she felt it was appropriate to determine the impacts and faults with the current
system before entering into long-term agreements.129 She highlighted that her
pause on issuing leases is standard procedure followed by the BLM when
assessing the coal-leasing program.130
Shortly after Secretary Jewell¶s order, the BLM began the process for
completing the PEIS. The first step of a NEPA review is the scoping process
where the agency in charge of the NEPA review determines the contours of
the review and the variety of alternatives that will be considered in the final

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id.
PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101, at ES-2.
JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 4.
43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(8) (West 2014).
JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 4(b).
Id. at § 2(a).
Id. at § 5.
Id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3475.2 (2014) (leases last 20 years or longer).
JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 4.
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document.131 As part of the scoping process, the BLM received input from
over 500 speakers at six public scoping meetings.132 The BLM issued its
scoping report on January 11, 2017.133 The report concluded that
modification of the federal coal-leasing program was warranted and
instructed the PEIS to focus on fair returns, climate change, resource
management and protection, and improved program administration.134
C. Trump Administration Coal-Leasing Policy
Coal leasing on public lands has had a renewed life under the Trump
Administration.135 Once President Trump came into office, the Department
of the Interior began by assessing the coal-leasing program through two
memos. The first was completed by acting BLM director Kristin Bail on
February 9, 2017.136 The Bail memo had five purposes: ³(1) identify the most
promising areas for coal leasing and development, (2) report on how much
coal mining is happening and where it is happening, (3) describe current
regulator activity, (4) identify the coal companies still in business, and (5)
determine how the BLM could spur coal mining.´137
131 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2014); James TB Tripp & Nathan G. Alley, Streamlining NEPA’s
Environmental Review Process: Suggestions for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74 (2003).
132 In this scoping process, the BLM received 214,886 comments²1,118 of which were unique.
There were also three external workshops that were held at universities. MICHAEL NEDD, BUREAU OF
LAND MGMT., RECOMMENDATION TO REVOKE ORDER 3308, (Mar. 28, 2017) (on file with author)
[hereinafter NEDD MEMO].
133 See generally PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101.
134 NEDD MEMO, supra note 132, at 1.
135 Eric Lipton & Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2017, at A1.
136 Bail was named Acting Director early in 2017 when her predecessor Neil Kornze stepped down
with the coming of the new administration. She had long worked for the BLM and other federal and state
resources agencies. She served only a few months before Michael Nedd was named Acting Director in
March 2017. He lasted until November 2017. Nedd had previously been acting director of the BLM¶s
Office of Energy and Minerals, and his selection was seen as a move to strengthen the role of energy
extraction on federal lands. Thomas Burr, Interior Names Energy and Mineral Chief New Acting BLM
LAKE
TRIB.
(Mar.
15,
2017),
Director,
SALT
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=5062376&itype=CMSID. As of this writing, Brian Steed, BLM¶s
Deputy Director for Programs and Policy, is exercising authority of the director. Leadership Overview,
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/leadership (last visited Feb. 28, 2018); see Dino
Grandoni, The Energy 202: New ‘Acting Director’ at Interior Office Worries Public Lands Advocates,
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy202/2017/11/20/the-energy-202-new-acting-director-at-interior-office-worries-public-landsadvocates/5a12341f30fb045a2e00325c/. As of April 2018, Trump had not yet nominated a new director.
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 allows the president to name acting directors who generally
serve for no more than 210 days. 5 U.S.C.A. § 3345±46 (West 2014).
137 BAIL MEMO, supra note 48, at 1. Notice that the tone of the questions assumes that one wants
to promote mining. Despite the moratorium, the BLM was not discussing whether coal mining should be
developed, but how best to do so.
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In her memo, Acting Director Bail described the five areas with the best
coal potential on federal lands and unsurprisingly, number one was the
Powder River Basin, where most coal extraction currently occurs.138 She also
explained that the Powder River Basin used to have a separate regulatory
requirement relating to a Regional Control Team, an independently
functioning advisory board made up of federal and state officials.139 The
BLM and lease applicants had to consult with (and defer to) the team in
deciding whether a particular coal lease should be processed in a public
forum. The Bail memo specifically responded to the OIG/GAO Reports from
2013 that audited the coal-mining process.140 Those reports included twentyone recommendations.141 Bail stated that all of the recommendations were
corrected to the satisfaction of OIG and GAO, and the inquiries from those
organizations are now closed.142
Bail noted that most actions that could help spur the coal industry are
beyond the BLM¶s control.143 But in looking for some action that would be
within its purview, she suggested streamlining some of the permit processes,
removing the Regional Control Team as redundant with other policies (such
as the NEPA process), and lifting the coal-leasing moratorium.144 While some
had suggested few coal companies would be interested in filing new lease
applications, as of February 2017, the BLM was processing twenty-eight
applications for initial leases and sixteen applications for leases by
amendment.145 At the time of Bail¶s memo, seven (of the forty-four) were on
hold due to economics.146 The memo also recommends higher staffing levels
for NEPA compliance as well as removing and updating policies, models,
and manuals, some of which date back to the 1980s.147
A little over a month later, with new Acting Director Michael Nedd at
the helm, the Trump Administration released a second memo recommending
the revocation of the coal-leasing moratorium.148 While the reasoning for
switching Acting Directors was not publicly explained (and at the time of this

138 Other sites were the Unita-Piceance Basin, Green River Basin, San Juan Basin, and areas of
Oklahoma and North Dakota. Id. at 2.
139 Id. at 3.
140 Id. at 1.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 3.
144 Id. Interestingly, Bail calls it a pause and not a moratorium, potentially based on her longer
time working at the BLM and her use of the common intra agency terminology.
145 Id. at 2.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 4±5.
148 NEDD MEMO, supra note 132, at 1.
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writing, we are on Acting Director number three with Brian Steed),149 the
elevation of Nedd was likely specifically to explore the development of
energy on public lands.150
Tasked with developing energy on public lands, Nedd quickly released
his own memo. In it, he recounted the current progress of the NEPA
review.151 His analysis of the PEIS scoping report (which stated that review
of the coal-leasing program was warranted) concluded that a PEIS is not
warranted.152 Acknowledging that some reforms might be desirable, the Nedd
memo concluded that a PEIS is not necessary to make needed reforms,
instead suggesting a BLM program review that would not involve a NEPA
process or a moratorium on coal leasing.153 Nedd also stated that it was not
sensible to wait for the completion of the NEPA process because the BLM
could not possibly complete the PEIS by its initial deadline.154
Nedd acknowledged the concerns with receiving a fair return for the
nation¶s coal.155 While the law requires a fair return, it offers no definition of
how to determine what is fair. For example, the BLM is not certain as to
whether it should be accounting for externalities or using a ³carbon adder´ to
calculate the appropriate minimum bids.156 This issue has been a topic of
conversation for years, Nedd pointed out, including in the 2013 OIG/GAO
reports.157 However, the OIG and GAO have since given the BLM the green
light, and the BLM has already implemented several changes, for example,

149 As Nedd¶s appointment was seen as a decision to focus on energy development, arguably
Steed¶s appointment is a shift towards a program of shrinking monuments and transferring public lands,
things he has advocated for in the past. It is also notable that instead of elevating someone who had been
a BLM employee for many years, this time Secretary Zinke named someone with greater ties to the states
(specifically Utah) than to the federal government. Secretary Zinke Names Land Transfer Proponent as
Acting Director of The Bureau of Land Management, CENTER FOR W. PRIORITIES, (Nov. 16, 2017),
http://westernpriorities.org/2017/11/16/secretary-zinke-names-land-transfer-proponent-as-actingdirector-of-the-bureau-of-land-management/.
150 In a statement at the time, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke said, ³Let me make one thing clear,
the Interior Department is in the energy business and Mike is an energy guy who understands the balance
we must strike when developing resources and creating jobs on our public lands.´ Thomas Burr, supra
note 136; Scott Streater, BLM’s “Energy Guy” May Signal the End of Big Renewables, E&E NEWS, (Mar.
31, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060052439.
151 NEDD MEMO, supra note 132, at 1.
152 Id. at 2.
153 Id. (stating that NEPA review is not the appropriate vehicle to analyze possible reforms because
BLM has its own review process already examining these issues).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 3.
156 Id. at 3-4.
157 Id. at 3.
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improving reports, accounting, and public access to documents.158 The BLM
has also already made changes to the bonus bidding process.159
These memos provided the background for the Trump Administration¶s
secretarial order on coal leasing. On March 29, 2017, Secretary of the Interior
Ryan Zinke revoked the pause, ending the moratorium on issuance of coal
leases.160 The purpose of the moratorium¶s repeal was economic.
Specifically, the order lifting the ban states that due to ³the critical
importance of the Federal coal leasing program to energy security, job
creation, and proper conservation stewardship´ the Administration was
removing the ban.161 Zinke seemed particularly concerned with the length
and cost of the environmental review process (which he described as costing
³many millions of dollars´ with completion ³no sooner than 2019´).162 Thus,
not only did the new policy lift the ban on coal leasing, it also halted the
process of environmental review while suggesting that the Administration
would still be considering potential improvements to the Federal Coal
Program.163
While the Zinke memo lists conservation stewardship as one of the
motivations for revoking the moratorium, it offers no explanation of how
such a move would be working to improve or protect conservation interests.
Secretary Zinke based his decision on information from the previous
executive order, the scoping process, and ³other information provided by
BLM.´164 The secretarial order describes the decision as ³consistent with the
principles of responsible public stewardship entrusted to this office.´165
With the pause now on the NEPA process, instead of on the issuance of
coal leases, the Administration looked to different tools to seek
improvements and participation in coal leasing.166 Thus, in September 2017,
the Trump Administration created an advisory committee on coal leasing. A

158

Id. at 4.
Id.
160 ZINKE ORDER, supra note 48, at 1.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Whether we consider the NEPA process to be paused or completely halted depends on whether
you think courts (or future administrations) will restart the process. Secretary Zinke declared the NEPA
process over. Id. at 2. Several environmental groups filed suit in the wake of this announcement, and a
court could potentially require further NEPA review. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 4, Citizens for Clean Energy v. Dep¶t of Interior, No. 4:17-CV-00030 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2017).
Additionally, a different presidential administration may seek to recommence NEPA review. Depending
on the timing and conditions of the coal industry, future NEPA processes may be able to use the alreadycompleted Scoping Report or a new Scoping Process may need to begin.
159
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Department of Interior press release described this move as a ³significant step
toward restoring public trust.´167 The Department of the Interior suggests that
the process will modernize land management while building greater trust and
transparency, describing a main goal of the process as ensuring that both
taxpayers and Native American tribes get the ³full and fair value´ of their
energy resources.168 The language is couched in economic terms with a focus
on extraction of value from natural resources. Indeed, although the
Department suggests a wide-ranging committee would examine various
aspects of coal leasing, the group is named the ³Royalty Policy
Committee.´169 Furthermore, its official objectives focus on calculating fair
market value of resources and ensuring the ³public receives the full value of
the natural resources produced from Federal Lands.´170
The committee is chaired by Vincent DeVito, an attorney specializing
in regulatory issues and government affairs.171 The committee has an equal
number of state and industry members (six each) along with four
representatives each from tribes and academia.172 Not all states are
represented. Not all tribes are represented. Eight different federal agencies
also send representatives.173 There are no nonprofit organizations; notably,
there are no environmental groups. At the first meeting in October 2017, the
group formed three subcommittees: (1) Subcommittee on Fair Return and
Revenue, (2) Subcommittee on Planning, Analysis, and Competitiveness,
and (3) the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs.174 It is not clear whether the
planning committee will consider environmental issues and there has not
been a suggestion that the fair return committee will consider externalities.

167 Press Release, Secretary Zinke Appoints Members to the Royalty Policy Committee, Announces
First Meeting, U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretaryzinke-appoints-members-royalty-policy-committee-announces-first-meeting. The group had its first
meeting on October 4, 2017.
168 Id.
169 U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR, ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER 1 (2017),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/2017_charter_royalty_policy_committee.pdf
[hereinafter ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER].
170 Id.; Press Release, Secretary Zinke Appoints Members to the Royalty Policy Committee,
OF
THE
INTERIOR
(Sept.
1,
2017),
DEP¶T
Announces
First
Meeting,
U.S.
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-zinke-appoints-members-royalty-policy-committeeannounces-first-meeting.
171 Confidential Interview with a Committee Member.
172 Id.
173 See ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 169, at 2.
174 Press Release, Readout of the First Meeting of Re-chartered U.S. Interior Royalty Policy
Committee, U.S. DEP¶T OF THE INTERIOR (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/readout-firstmeeting-re-chartered-us-interior-royalty-policy-committee.
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While there are complaints about transparency, committee meetings are open
to the public and available online.175
These movements from the Trump Administration leave us with a coalleasing program governed by regulations and royalty rules from the 1970s,
operations without environmental review, and a stated intention to continue
evaluating the coal-leasing program while still issuing leases under the old
system. The progress on such re-evaluation is uncertain. The only clear
process at the time of this writing is the advisory committee, which even
committee members view as ineffectual.
III. NATURAL RESOURCE FEDERALISM AND TRUMPISM
With a basic understanding of the tenets of federalism in the natural
resources context from section II and a detailed understanding of the federal
coal-leasing process in section III, we can now contemplate how the coalleasing process fits into the federalism ideals of the current Administration.
Concerns about the federal coal-leasing process and its potential for only
benefiting a small section of society are not new. We have over fifty years of
critiques regarding the issuance of leases and calculation of fair market value.
We have over thirty years of concerns regarding environmental and health
impacts of coal leasing. On some topics, the Obama and Trump
Administrations seem to be focusing on repairing similar troubles. Both
administrations acknowledge a need for comprehensive review of the federal
coal program to help ensure taxpayers receive a fair return on the value of the
natural resources. There is marked disagreement, however, in how to go
about remedying these agreed-upon problems and in who gets to participate
in the decision-making process. The Obama Administration called for a
lengthy, time-consuming, and expensive review process. For the three years
that Interior officials anticipated the review taking, they placed a moratorium
on issuing new leases. In the early phases of that process, we saw high levels
of public information and public involvement, with many descriptive orders
and background reports. The process included participation of different
stakeholders including tribes, states, energy companies, environmental
groups, and other interested parties.

175 Mary Ellen Kustin, Trump Allows Coal Companies To Take Taxpayers For A Ride, Opens Up
Mining On Public Lands, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 28, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/trump-oks-morecoal-mining-on-public-lands-6ef0d8769be4/. At the second meeting of the committee, the group voted to
recommend significantly reducing royalty rates for offshore oil and gas production, urged increased
drilling in the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, and suggested further streamlining of environmental review
processes. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, U.S. Advisory Panel Pushes for Lower Offshore Oil Royalties,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-28/lower-offshore-oilroyalties-urged-by-u-s-advisory-panel.
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The Trump Administration, by contrast, quickly and without any
additional public involvement decided to end the environmental review
process and revoke the moratorium. 176 The Trump Administration was able
to take advantage of reports and processes conducted under the Obama
Administration, but those reports were largely not written with the idea that
coal leasing would continue during the review process and, therefore, some
of the estimates on impacts may not have been adequate.
The central disagreement between the two administrations seems to
focus on whether consideration of health and environmental impacts of coal
should be included in a review of the program, and whether it makes sense
to continue issuing leases that no one really thinks are fair. A problem with
lifting the moratorium now is that it keeps the current royalties at the levels
set over thirty years ago during the last review.
The approach of the Trump Administration is questionable in light of
the struggling coal industry, his campaign promises to promote coal at all
costs, and his decision not to consult with environmental interests. This shift
is accompanied by rhetoric from the Administration denouncing bureaucracy
and promoting more local management and decision-making regarding
natural resources. If the Trump Administration is working based on a
philosophy that states should be able to make decisions regarding their
resources, it would make sense to give the states a larger role in the decision
of when and where coal leases are granted. Perhaps the Administration is
assuming states simply want immediate monetary returns and, therefore,
increased coal leasing at all levels is fulfilling state goals even if not directly
conveying control to states.177 Seen in that lens, the choice to reduce
bureaucracy is coincident with the view of a federalism that minimizes
federal involvement and recognizes stronger ideas of state autonomy.
While federalism and reduced bureaucracy may serve as the external
justifications of Trump policies, that rationale can be hard to reconcile with
a decision-making process (and result) that benefits a very small sector²
owners of coal operations. The recent moves from the Department of the
Interior with both the Zinke Order and the coal-leasing advisory committee
suggest the Department is running more like a company, setting profit
maximization over other goals. Voters need to consider whether that is the
176 The rapid Trump administration process may make the new rules more susceptible to challenge
because under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must show a reasoned basis for policy
changes. The Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105 (D.D.C. 2003).
177 The reasoning here may be a bit difficult to parse as all current and previous reports agree that
the United States (and the states who share in the returns) is receiving well below the value of the resource.
Delaying or pausing the issuance of coal leases would hopefully lead to leases issued under more favorable
conditions. But stakeholders need to decide whether they favor getting the maximum return currently
available or waiting for a process that might ultimately increase their returns. Coal mining states seem to
be lobbying for the former.
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right goal, and lawyers should consider whether such an approach aligns with
federal law.178
If one agrees that profit maximization is the proper goal for the nation¶s
coal leasing and federal lands programs, one should still investigate whether
the methods currently being employed by the Department of the Interior are
likely to reach that goal. The Interior Department¶s approach for re-assessing
the leasing rates appears to be centered on the coal-leasing advisory
committee. Yet, the advisory committee does not include a large variety of
voices, is (as its name implies) merely advisory, and is only required to meet
twice a year.179 Even members of the committee do not believe that the
Trump Administration is giving it much attention or respect.
Outside the Royalty Committee, there may be some internal processes
occurring that the public has not been privy to. Statements by the Trump
Administration, however, suggest that the economic accounting will not be
looking at the full economic costs of the activity.180 For a coal company
extracting coal from public land, the narrower view of accounting for fair
market value may be a promising venture. A close look at which
arrangements will yield the highest royalties might also look good to state
authorities, who will share in the royalty payments without having any of the
burdens of being a land manager or owner. But as the holder of the land, the
federal government should use a different calculus that also considers other
features like opportunities lost, ability to recover the land, and other issues
including contamination, protection of historic and cultural sites, waste
management, and water quality. Indeed, the BLM should consider coal-

178 A report from the New York Times argues that the changes and reversals of the Trump
Administration can often be tied directly to oil, coal, and gas companies along with other industry groups,
seeming to indicate that the Trump Administration views such groups as an important constituency whose
interests should be reflected in administration policy. The Trump Administration has closer relationships
with industry and energy groups than any previous president. Former EPA Director Pruitt met with them
almost daily. Nadja Popovich et al., 67 Environmental Rules on Their Way Out Under the Trump
(Jan.
31,
2018),
TIMES
Administration,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-reversed.html.
179 Although it appears they will meet quarterly. They first met on October 4, 2017 and then again
on February 28, 2018. Press Release, Readout of the First Meeting of Re-chartered U.S. Interior Royalty
OF
THE
INTERIOR
(Oct.
4,
2017),
DEP¶T
Policy
Committee,
U.S.
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/readout-first-meeting-re-chartered-us-interior-royalty-policycommittee; Dlouhy, supra note 175.
180 See, e.g., Peter Fairley, States Are Using Social Cost of Carbon in Energy Decisions, Despite
CLIMATE
NEWS
(Aug.
14,
2017),
Trump’s
Opposition,
INSIDE
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/11082017/states-climate-change-policy-calculate-social-cost-carbon
(describing the Trump Administration¶s opposition to accounting for carbon emissions in policy
decisions); Meredith Fowlie & Mazimilian Auffhammer, Why Rick Perry’s Proposed Subsidies For Coal
Fail Economics 101, CONVERSATION (Oct. 8, 2017), http://theconversation.com/why-rick-perrysproposed-subsidies-for-coal-fail-economics-101-83339 (describing Energy Secretary Rick Perry¶s
unusual view of coal mining as having positive instead of negative externalities).
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leasing operations in the context of its overarching agency mandate to protect
natural resources.181
Beyond the coal-leasing program, the Trump Administration is also
adopting other policies to expand the extraction of coal and fossil fuels on
federal lands. One way it is doing so is by opening up lands that had been
declared off limits for coal extraction in previous administrations. For
example, desire for additional available land for fossil fuel extraction appears
to be one of the driving motivations behind the Administration¶s efforts to
reduce the size of national monuments.182 On December 4, 2017, Trump
declared that he would reduce Bears Ears National Monument by 85% and
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument by nearly 46%.183 At a rally
announcing the decision, Trump couched the change in policy as a response
to local needs and interests, stating: ³They don¶t know your land, and truly,
they don¶t care for your land like you do.´184 He identified the ³they´ in his
sentence as ³a small handful of very distant bureaucrats located in
Washington´ who control the natural resources of Utah under the previous
framework.185 On February 2, 2018, the shrinkage of the monuments
officially occurred and formerly protected lands are now open to new mining
claims.186 While it is not clear whether there will be many applications for
permits or leases on these lands, the Utah BLM office has begun preparing
maps and information for those who are interested in exploring the mineral
potential of the lands.187 The Utah Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining had not
received any applications as of February 8, 2018 and doesn¶t anticipate new
claims ³anytime soon.´188

181 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(8) (West 2017) (³the public lands [are to] be managed in a manner that
will protect the quality of the scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric,
water rHVRXUFHVDQGDUFKDHRORJLFDOYDOXHV«´); id. at § 1732(b) (requiring the prevention of ³unnecessary
or undue degradation of the lands´).
182 This parallels efforts to withdraw from previously negotiated plans to protect the sage grouse,
whose wide range unfortunately overlaps with lands that may not be attractive for hydrofracking. See Bret
Birdsong, The Grid and the Grouse: Cooperative Federal-State Conservation Planning in the Ages of
Obama and Trump, 13 FIU L. REV. 103, 115±26 (2018).
183 Josh Dawsey & Julet Eilperin, Trump Shrinks Two Huge National Monuments in Utah,
POST
(Dec.
4,
2017),
Drawing
Praise
and
Protests,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-scales-back-two-huge-national-monuments-in-utahdrawing-praise-and-protests/2017/12/04/758c85c6-d908-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Timothy Cama, Trump’s National Monument Rollbacks Take Effect, HILL (Feb. 2, 2018),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/372007-trumps-national-monument-rollbacks-take-effect.
187 Id.
188 Josh Siegel, Bears Ears Gets No Mining Applications, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 8, 2018),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/bears-ears-gets-no-mining-applications/article/2648556. It seems
likely that uranium, not coal, will be the natural resources exploited in the area. Id.
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The Renewable Energy Zones in the California and Arizona deserts are
also at risk.189 As part of several studies, a long public process, and
stakeholder negotiations, the BLM established renewable energy zones
where solar energy development would be promoted and facilitated on
federal lands with other areas set aside for habitat conservation.190 The Trump
Administration has announced its intention to change some of the terms of
the deal and now allow mining on some of the lands targeted for solar
development.191 Solar development and coal mining will not be able to coexist.
The North Bering Sea example is also an interesting one. On December
9, 2016, President Obama issued an order seeking to protect the Bering Sea;
the stated goal of the Obama Policy was to conserve arctic biodiversity,
tribes, climate, and economy of the area.192 The policy sought to do so by
enhancing the resilience, and particularly the climate resilience, of the area.193
Obama had invoked section 12(a) of Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act
allowing the president to ³withdraw from disposition any of the unleased
lands.´194 Such withdrawal prevents consideration of the area for future oil
and gas leasing.195 The Trump Administration quickly took aim at this Obama
policy to open more areas up to energy extraction as part of his America First
Offshore Energy Strategy.196
One way to think about these changes is to say that before the current
Administration, we had a broader sense of who the public was in public lands.

189 Scott Streater, BLM Proposal Would Revive Mining in Renewable Energy Zone, E&E News
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060062795.
190 For detail on the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan, which is also currently at risk,
see Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable Energy Gold Rush,
15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 293 (2014); Sammy Roth, In Stunning Reversal, Trump Could Open
California Desert to More Solar and Wind Farms, DESERT SUN (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2018/02/01/trump-could-open-california-desertmore-solar-and-wind-farms-mining-off-roading/1087021001/; Birdsong, supra note 182, at 114±17.
191 Streater, supra note 189.
192 Executive Order, Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order 13754, 81 Fed. Reg.
240 (Dec. 14, 2016); Fact Sheet: White House Announces Actions to Protect Natural and Cultural
(Dec. 9, 2016),
Resources in Alaskan Arctic Ocean, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=122606.
193 Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area, OCEANA, http://usa.oceana.org/northernbering-sea-climate-resilience-area (last visited Mar. 6, 2018).
194 43 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a) (West 2014).
195 NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL & EARTHJUSTICE, BRIEFER ON PRESIDENTIAL WITHDRAWAL UNDER
OCSLA SEC. 12(A) 1 (2016), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/briefer-presidential-withdrawal-underoscla-sec-12a (download the PDF using the link on the right side menu, labelled ³Downloads´) (last
visited Feb. 23, 2018).
196 Diana Hacker, Trump Issues Executive Order Revoking Northern Bering Sea Protection and
Tribal Participation, NOME NUGGET (May 5, 2017), http://www.nomenugget.com/news/trump-issuesexecutive-order-revoking-northern-bering-sea-protection-and-tribal-participation.
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The government¶s role is to protect the public lands on behalf of all of the
people of the nation including those not yet born. The current Administration
is shifting that in two ways. One way is a traditional republican approach that
reflects a change in political philosophy²devolving more decision-making
power to the states. Indeed, this even includes conveying some land to the
states. It also includes opening public land to use by private individuals (e.g.,
grazing), increasing royalties to states, and working more with the states on
what their desires for the land and resources might be. While not everyone
will agree that the states should play a more prominent role in federal land
policy, (shifting the idea of ³public´ from the whole country to those
geographically linked to the actual land at issue), it is a consistent and
defendable political choice. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration also
seems to be privileging another category²business interests. Opening up
land to greater resource extraction in many places is benefiting the energyproducing industries that have supported him without providing added
advantage to the people in the region. The enactment of policies beneficial to
the coal industry occurs alongside rules that harm coal communities,
including removing funding for remediation of abandoned mines in the
President¶s budget proposals,197 allowing dumping of debris into nearby
streams,198 canceling a requirement that oil and gas companies report on
methane emissions,199 and approving controversial pipelines despite local
protests and documented spills.200
These policies that seem to privilege very few and both hurt community
members and diminish public resources leave one to question: who is
President Trump defining as America when he promises to put the country
and the people first?

197 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AMERICA FIRST: A BUDGET BLUEPRINT TO MAKE AMERICA
GREAT
AGAIN
27
(2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf.
198 Jeremy Deaton, Congress is Set to Overturn the Stream Protection Rule, THINK PROGRESS
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/congress-is-set-to-overturn-the-stream-protection-rule1829c522f388/#.gixqd6viv.
199 Popovich et al., supra note 178.
200 Mayra Cuevas & Steve Almsay, Keystone Pipeline leaks 210,000 Gallons of Oil in South
Dakota, CNN (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/16/us/keystone-pipeline-leak/index.html;
Elise Labott & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Administration Approves Keystone XL Pipeline, CNN (March
24, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/23/politics/keystone-xl-pipeline-trump-approve/index.html.

